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THE PHYSICIAN'S RIGHT TO HOSPITAL STAFF
MEMBERSHIP: THE PUBLIC -PRIVATE DICHOTOMY
The rule is well established that a private hospital has a right to ex-
clude any physician from practising therein. The action of hospital
authorities in refusing to appoint a physician or surgeon to its medical
staff, or declining to renew an appointment that has expired, or ex-
cluding any physician or surgeon from practising in the hospital, is not
subject to judicial review. The decision of the hospital authorities in
such matters is final.'
With the rapid advances that have been made in diagnostic techniques
requiring the use of extensive (and expensive) machinery, access to hos-
pital facilities is a practical necessity for a physician and his patients. How-
ever, the right of a physician to become a staff member of a hospital and,
consequently, to use its facilities, depends to a great extent on whether the
hospital is characterized as public or private. If the hospital is public, a
licensed physician has the right to use its facilities for the treatment of his
patients so long as he abides by the rules and regulations of the hospital.
On the other hand, the board of directors of a private hospital has almost
unlimited discretion in deciding whether a physician should have staff mem-
bership. This note examines in detail the right of a physician to staff mem-
bership in light of the traditional distinction made between public and
private hospitals.
Traditionally, corporations were classified as either public or private. The
distinction was first made by Mr. Justice Story in 1819:
[P]ublic corporations are such only as are founded by the government
for public purposes, where the whole interests belong also to the gov-
ernment. If, therefore, the foundation be private, though under the
charter of the government, the corporation is private, however exten-
sive the uses to which it is devoted, either by the bounty of the founder
or the nature and objects of the institution.2
1. Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 63 (D.D.C. 1963). Gen-
erally speaking, there are two types of hospitals: public and private. The private hos-
pitals may be further subdivided into charitable (non-profit) and proprietary (profit-
making) hospitals. The latter are beyond the scope of this note for two reasons. First,
they represent a small percentage of the private hospitals. Second, and more important,
the thesis of the note is that since public hospitals and private charitable hospitals are
practically indistinguishable, they should be treated the same. Proprietary hospitals, on
the other hand, are set up for a different purpose and provide a different function. It
thus does no violence to the law to treat them as a separate entity.
2. Trustees of Darmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 668-69
(1819).
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Because they took the corporate form, hospitals were similarly divided. A
public hospital is defined as a hospital founded and operated by the gov-
ernment, supported by public funds, and run by government appointees
for the good of the state.' Not surprisingly, a private hospital is generally
defined as an institution which, although established by the permission of
the legislature, is not supported by government funds, run by government
officers, or subject to the control of the government.4 Some courts have
adopted a broader definition of a private hospital, holding that the sole
test is whether the corporation has the power to elect its own officers;' if it
does, the hospital is said to be private. Even a hospital which exists solely
to serve the community as a public charity will not be classified as public
unless it meets the above tests.6
3. Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 61 (D.D.C. 1963); Edson
v. Griffin Hosp., 21 Conn. Supp. 55, 58, 144 A.2d 341, 343 (1958); Van Campen v.
Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y. Supp. 554 (1924), aff'd per curiam,
239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1925); Khoury v. Community Memorial Hosp., Inc., 203
Va. 236, 123 S.E.2d 533 (1962); State ex reL Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n,
149 W. Va. 229, 140 S.E.2d 457 (1965); see BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 7 (rev. ed.
1946); FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 58, at 279 (penn. ed. rev. repl. 1963).
4. E.g., Edson v. Griffin Hosp., supra note 3; Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174,
178, 46 A.2d 298, 300 (1946); Khoury v. Community Memorial Hosp., supra note 3, at
244, 123 S.E.2d at 538; State ex rel. Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, supra note 3.
5. E.g., Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 61 (D.D.C. 1963);
Edson v. Griffin Hosp., supra note 3.
6. E.g., Shulman v. Washington Hosp., Center, supra note 5; Edson v. Griffin Hosp.,
supra note 3; West Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Hoare, 64 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1953); Van Cam-
pen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y. Supp. 554 (1924), aff'd per
curiam, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1925).
Courts have refused to characterize a hospital as public, even if the legislature allows
the hospital tax exemption as a charity, Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174 46 A.2d 298
(1946); Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., supra; State ex rel. Sams v. Ohio Valley
Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 149 W. Va. 229, 140 S.E.2d 457 (1965), or charitable immunity from
tort actions, Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., supra; State ex rel. Sams v. Ohio Valley
Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, supra. The fact that the hospital has received government funds for the
care of indigents, Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, supra; Edson v. Griffin Hosp.,
supra; West Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Hoare, supra; Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., supra;
or for construction purposes, Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, supra; Stanturf v.
Sipes, 224 F. Supp. 883, 891 (W.D. Mo. 1963), aff'd, 335 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 977 (1965); Akopiantz v. Board of County Comm'rs, 65 N.M. 125, 333
P.2d 611 (1959); Khoury v. Community Memorial Hosp., Inc., 203 Va. 236, 123 S.E.2d
533 (1962); State ex rel. Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, supra, does not trans-
form a private hospital into a public one.
Often the receipt of funds under the Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1964), has
provided the basis for plaintiff's argument. E.g., Khoury v. Community Memorial Hosp.,
supra. The Hill-Burton Act provides federal funds for hospital construction which are
administered through the state government. If a public hospital is defined as one sup.
ported by public funds and controlled by the government, it has been argued that the
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I. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF CHARACTERIZATION AS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE
A. Public Hospitals
In Hayman v. City of Galveston,7 the Supreme Court held that "it is not
incumbent on the state to maintain a hospital for the private practice of
medicine."' This decision became the basis for subsequent state holdings
that a physician has no constitutional right to practice in a public hospital.9
However, the right to practice one's profession has been recognized as a
species of property which may not be taken away without due process of
law." Out of these two lines of cases has grown the idea that a licensed
physician or surgeon has the right to use the facilities of a public hospital
for the treatment of his patients so long as he abides by its rules and regu-
receipt of funds under the Hill-Burton program and the attendant controls are suffi-
cient to characterize the hospital as public. In rejecting this argument, the courts have
relied on § 291 (in) of the Hill-Burton Act, which reads:
Except as otherwise specifically provided, nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed as conferring on any Federal officer or employee the right to exercise
any supervision or control over the administration, personnel, maintenance, or
operation of any facility with respect to which any funds have been or may be
expended under this subchapter. (Emphasis added.)
The courts read this section as divesting the federal government of any control or super-
vision it might have had as a result of the grant of government funds to the hospital.
Under this interpretation of § 291 (in), the relationship between the government and
the hospital is held to be insufficient to support a finding that the hospital is a public
facility. Control, say the courts, rests with the hospital, not the government. The courts
reach this result despite the fact that the exceptions to the general rule of § 291 (m)-
that a Federal officer shall have no control over the hospital's action-are extensive and
detailed. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 53.11-.165 (Supp. 1966). Furthermore, § 291(m) is
titled "State control of operations," indicating that while the act prohibits certain federal
supervision, it does so in order to reserve such control to the state, not to the hospital.
7. 273 U.S. 414 (1927).
8. Id. at 417.
9. Findlay v. Board of Supervisors, 72 Ariz. 58, 230 P.2d 526 (1951); Newton v.
Commissioners, 86 Colo. 446, 282 Pac. 1068 (1929); West Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Hoare,
64 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1953); Bryant v. City of Lakeland, 158 Fla. 151, 28 So. 2d 106
(1946); State ex rel. Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 149 W. Va. 229, 140
S.E.2d 457 (1965); see Dayan v. Wood River Township Hosp., 18 Ill. App. 2d 263,
152 N.E.2d 205 (1958); cf. Duson v. Poage, 318 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
10. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); accord, People v. Love, 298 Ill.
304, 131 N.E. 809 (1921). But see Alpert v. Board of Governors of City Hosp., 286
App. Div. 542, 142 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1955) (valuable privilege); Wallington v. Zinn, 146
W. Va. 147, 118 S.E.2d 526 (1961) (valuable right); In re Adkins, 83 W. Va. 673,
98 S.E. 888 (1919); Application for License to Practice Law, 67 W. Va. 213, 67
S.E. 597 (1910).
The right to follow either one of these professions [medicine and law] is one of
the fundamental rights of citizenship. A person's business, profession, or occupa-
tion is at the same time "property," within the meaning of the constitutional pro-
vision as to due process of law, and is also included in the right to liberty and the
pursuit of happiness. People v. Love, supra at 310-11, 131 N.E. at 811.
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lations." Further, the courts have required that such rules be not "un-
reasonable."' 2
Generally, the rules and regulations of a hospital are not unreasonable
if they bear "some reasonable relation" to the operation of the hospital and
the welfare of the patients. 3 Thus, in Rosner v. Eden Township Hosp.
Dist.,4 the hospital's board of directors excluded the plaintiff on the ground
that he was neither "temperamentally suitable for hospital staff practice,"
nor worthy in professional ethics or character. It was stipulated that "moral
character" and competence with respect to "education, skill and experi-
ence"'15 were not in issue. The court found the grounds unreasonable, hold-
ing that in the operation of a hospital, it is likely that some disagreements
over methods of treatment will arise. Since the prime concern of a hospital
is the welfare of its patients, the court said that a physician should not be
11. Findlay v. Board of Supervisors, 72 Ariz. 58, 230 P.2d 526 (1951); Ware v.
Benedikt, 225 Ark. 185, 280 S.W.2d 234 (1955); Hamilton County Hosp. v. Andrews,
227 Ind. 228, 84 N.E.2d 469 (1949); Henderson v. City of Knoxville, 157 Tenn. 477, 9
S.W.2d 697 (1928); State ex rel. Bronaugh v. City of Parkersburg, 148 W. Va. 560,
136 S.E.2d 783 (1964).
12. Findlay v. Board of Supervisors, supra note 11; Ware v. Benedikt, supra note 11;
Martino v. Concord Community Hosp. Dist., 233 Cal. App. 2d 51, 43 Cal. Rptr. 255
(1965); Rosner v. Peninsula Hosp. Dist., 224 Cal. App. 2d 115, 36 Cal. Rptr. 332
(1964); Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 345 P.2d 93 (1959);
Bryant v. City of Lakeland, 158 Fla. 151, 28 So. 2d 106 (1946); Green v. City of St.
Petersburg, 154 Fla. 339, 17 So. 2d 517 (1944); Hamilton County Hosp. v. Andrews,
supra note 11; Jacobs v. Martin, 20 N.J. Super. 531, 90 A.2d 151 (1952); Henderson
v. City of Knoxville, supra note 11; Group Health Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc'y.,
39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951); State ex rel. Bronaugh v. City of Parkers-
burg, supra note 11; Johnson v. City of Ripon, 259 Wis. 84, 47 N.W.2d 328 (1951); Me-
morial Hosp. v. Pratt, 72 Wyo. 120, 262 P.2d 682 (1953); Shulman v. Washington Hosp.
Center, 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963) (dictum); West Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Hoare,
64 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1953) (dictum); Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n,
395 Pa. 257, 149 A.2d 456 (1959) (dictum); State ex rel. Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen.
Hosp. Ass'n, 149 W. Va. 229, 140 S.E.2d 457 (1965) (dictum); see Rosner v. Eden
Township Hosp. Dist., 58 Cal. 2d 592, 375 P.2d 431, 25 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1962); Mizell
v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 175 So. 2d 583 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965); Giles v. Breaux, 160
So. 2d 608 (La. Ct. App. 1964); Tuchman v. Trussell, 43 Misc. 2d 255, 250 N.Y.S.2d
913 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Khoury v. Community Memorial Hosp., 203 Va. 236, 123 S.E.2d
533 (1962) (dictum).
13. Ware v. Benedikt, supra note 12; Rosner v. Peninsula Hosp. Dist., supra note 12;
Hershey, Legal Dangers in Obsolete Hospital Documents, Hospitals, Aug. 1, 1964, p.
47; see Findlay v. Board of Supervisors, supra note 11; Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp.
Dist., supra note 12; Bryant v. City of Lakeland, supra note 12; Green v. City of St.
Petersburg, supra note 12; Giles v. Breaux, supra note 12; Alpert v. Board of Governors
of City Hosp., 286 App. Div. 542, 142 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1955); Note, 17 STAN. L. REV.
900, 909 (1965); cf. Group Health Ins. v. Howell, 40 N.J. 436, 193 A.2d 103 (1963).
But see Wallington v. Zinn, 146 W. Va. 147, 118 S.E.2d 526 (1961).
14. 58 Cal. 2d 592, 375 P.2d 431 (1962).
15. Id. at 594, 375 P.2d at 432.
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stifled by a fear that he will be considered "temperamentally unsuitable."' 6
Temporary revocation of a physician's license at some earlier period has
been held an unreasonable justification for rejection. 7 It was reasoned that
if the state licensing board considered the physician competent and worthy
of a license at the time of his application to the hospital, prior misconduct
should not, of itself, cause his rejection."
Courts are apparently willing to allow more stringent rules when the
controversy involves the admission of surgeons and their regulation once
16. In asserting their views as to proper treatment and hospital practices, many
physicians will become involved in a certain amount of dispute and friction, and a
determination that such common occurrences have more than their usual signifi-
cance and show temperamental unsuitability for hospital practice of one of the
doctors is of necessity highly conjectural. In these circumstances there is a danger
that the requirement of temperamental suitability will be applied as a subterfuge
where considerations having no relevance to fitness are present. Id. at 598, 375
P.2d at 435.
17. Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 714-15, 345 P.2d 93,
96-97 (1959). The plaintiff had been guilty of misconduct in the past for which he had
been disciplined by the State Board of Medical Examiners. At the time of his applica-
tion for staff membership, however, the State Board had reinstated him.
18. It has also been held unreasonable for the board of directors to delegate its
authority to decide the question of staff membership to a private body, on the theory
that the power to make hospital decisions is a power of the board alone which cannot
be delegated. Apparently a private body is any group or organization other than the
board itself. E.g., Rosner v. Peninsula Hosp. Dist., 224 Cal. App. 2d 115, 122, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 332, 336-37 (1964); cf. Group Health Ins. v. Howell, 40 N.J. 436, 444, 193 A.2d
103, 107-08 (1963).
Thus it has been held unreasonable to require membership on the active staff of the
hospital-which staff had complete power to determine its own membership-before
a physician might practice in the hospital, on the ground that this gave to the staff-a
private group-a veto power over who might use the hospital. Hamilton County Hosp.
v. Andrews, 227 Ind. 217, 226, 84 N.E.2d 469, 472, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 831 (1949);
see Henderson v. City of Knoxville, 157 Tenn. 477, 9 S.W.2d 697 (1928) (dictum)
(unreasonable to grant manager of hospital discretionary power to dismiss).
In a case in which a physician was denied reappointment to the staff of a public hos-
pital until such time as he should be reappointed to the staff of a nearby private hospital,
the court held such a rule unreasonable as being completely beyond the control of either
the hospital, the physician or the courts. State ex rel. Bronaugh v. City of Parkersburg,
148 W. Va. 649, 136 S.E.2d 783 (1964).
A California hospital justified a by-law requiring all physicians applying for staff ap-
pointment to either have malpractice insurance or sufficient funds to cover any such
claims themselves on the recent decisions holding charitable hospitals liable for the
negligent torts of their servants. The court held that this amounted to a delegation of the
power to appoint staff members to the insurance companies; refusal to insure amounted
to refusal of staff privileges. This by-law was held unreasonable. Rosner v. Peninsula
Hosp. Dist., supra.
Finally, while it has been held reasonable to require that all staff doctors conform to
the code of ethics of the local professional societies, People ex rel. Replogle v. Julia F.
Burnham Hosp., 71 I11. App. 246 (1897), it is unreasonable to require membership in
local medical societies, Hamilton County Hosp. v. Andrews, supra, or to require approval
by them, Ware v. Benedikt, 225 Ark. 185, 188-89, 280 S.W.2d 234, 236 (1955).
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they have become members." These rules usually require, after initial ad-
mission to the medical staff, a period of probationary surgical staff member-
ship during which time the surgeon is observed by senior staff members.
Only following approval of the surgeon's work during this probationary
period may a surgeon obtain senior surgical staff membership. These rules
have been justified as necessary to protect the public from unskilled sur-
geons, and the hospital from negligence suits in those jurisdictions where
charitable immunity has been abolished.2"
Sometimes hospitals adopt by-laws which exclude certain groups en
masse. The validity of these by-laws seems to depend on whether the group
excluded is composed of medical doctors. Thus, rules excluding osteopaths
or chiropractors have been held not unreasonable.2 These holdings are
justified on the basis that different schools of healing have different methods
of operation. Therefore, say the courts, it is not unreasonable for the board
of directors to want one harmonious system of medicine practiced in the
19. Green v. City of St. Petersburg, 154 Fla. 339, 17 So. 2d 517 (1944); Selden v.
City of Sterling, 316 Ill. App. 455, 45 N.E.2d 329 (1942) ; Hamilton County Hosp. v. An-
drews, supra note 18.
"It is clear that these rules close the door against possible dope fiends, liquor heads,
and practitioners not qualified to perform major surgical operations." Green v. City of St.
Petersburg, supra, at 346, 17 So. 2d at 520 (Chapman, J., concurring).
20. "When the City furnishes the facilities and takes the risk against their negligent
use, it is not too much to require that he who wields the knife does so in the philosophy
of the twentieth rather than in that of the eighteenth century." Green v. City of St.
Petersburg, supra note 19, at 344, 17 So. 2d at 519.
For a discussion of the demise of the charitable immunity doctrine see Horty, Status
of the Doctrine of Charitable Immunity in Hospital Cases, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 343
(1964).
21. E.g., Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927); Newton v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 86 Colo. 446, 282 Pac. 1068 (1929); Richardson v. City of
Miami, 144 Fla. 294, 198 So. 51 (1940); Duson v. Poage, 318 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958). Contra, Stribling v. Jolley, 241 Mo. App. 1123, 253 S.W.2d 519 (1953)
(interpretation of state statute). The conflict between the AMA and the osteopaths is
an old one, a full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this note. It should be
pointed out, however, that in this struggle, the AMA, by one means or another, has
managed to keep osteopaths off the staffs of most hospitals. Thus, in Wallington v.
Zinn, 146 W. Va. 147, 118 S.E.2d 526 (1961), the Joint Committee on Accreditation
of Hospitals rescinded accreditation for the sole reason that the hospital had osteopaths
on its staff. When they were dismissed, accreditation was restored. In Duson v. Poage,
supra, all medical doctors and registered nurses quit when the board of directors ap-
pointed two osteopaths to the staff, and would not return until they were removed.
Recently, the feud with the osteopaths has cooled, and it is doubtful whether the AMA
and its local affiliates will long continue their policy of strict opposition to staff privileges
for osteopaths. However, their feelings about chiropractors have not changed. The
AMA's House of Delegates recently adopted a resolution which stated that "chiropractic
is an unscientific cult whose practitioners lack the necessary training and background
to diagnose and treat human disease." AMA News, Dec. 12, 1966, p.1, col. 2.
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hospital. However, when the exclusion is aimed at medical doctors because,
for example, they are members of a group health plan which the American
Medical Association frowns upon, the exclusion has been held unreason-
able. 2 Although osteopaths and chiropractors may be excluded because
the welfare of the patients is best promoted by consistency among staff
members as to basic concepts of healing, no such justification exists when
the group excluded consists of licensed medical doctors. The latter's ex-
clusion is based upon a dislike of their ideas, and is not related to the quality
or type of care which they give their patients.
The right to practice one's profession has been recognized as a species of
property, which cannot be taken away without due process of law. Thus,
a physician may not be refused his initial bid for staff membership23 or
refused reappointment 4 unless he is given ample notice that such action is
about to be taken. Furthermore, he is entitled to a hearing before the board
of directors, with the right to be represented by counsel and to present and
cross-examine witnesses.
In addition, if a physician qualifies under the hospital's rules as they
existed at the time of his application, the hospital cannot amend its rules
to disqualify the physician after he has filed suit to compel admission. As
one court has said, once ground rules have been announced, the board can-
not change "the rules while the game [is] in progress. ' 25
Finally, the hospital rules must be applied uniformly.s If a board of
directors attempts to apply a higher standard to the performance of one
physician than it applies to that of others, a court will intervene.2"
22. Group Health Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d
737 (1951). For a full discussion of the conflict between the AMA and its members on
the one hand and the group practice plans on the other see Comment, 22 U. CHi. L. REv.
694 (1955), Comment, 63 YALE L.J. 938, 976-97 (1954).
23. Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 715-16, 345 P.2d
93, 97 (1959); State ex rel. Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 149 W. Va. 229,
140 S.E.2d 457 (1965) (dictum); Note, 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 327, 338-39 (1961).
24. Johnson v. City of Ripon, 259 Wis. 84, 87, 47 N.W.2d 328, 330 (1951).
25. Ware v. Benedikt, 225 Ark. 185, 280 S.W.2d 234, 237 (1955).
26. Alpert v. Board of Governors of City Hosp., 286 App. Div. 542, 145 N.Y.S.2d
534 (1955); see Rosner v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal. App. 2d 592, 375
P.2d 431 (1962).
27. Giles v. Breaux, 160 So. 2d 608 (La. Ct. App. 1964). Michigan has relied on an
interpretation of its public hospital statute, Micu. STAT. ANN. § 14.531 (1956), to decide
these cases. See Albert v. Board of Trustees of Gogebic County Pub. Hosp., 341 Mich.
344, 67 N.W.2d 244 (1954).
In no section of the act is there any suggestion that the hospital board may suspend,
even partially, the license of a regularly licensed practitioner. Suspension is left
with the State board of registration in medicine....
The license of plaintiff Albert granted him by the State board includes practice
in public hospitals and shall be presumed to continue in such public hospitals until
Washington University Open Scholarship
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B. Private Hospitals
The test of reasonableness applied to public hospitals is not applied to
private institutions. Instead, the rule has developed that a private hospital
has the right to exclude any physician from practicing therein. Exclusion
rests entirely within the sound discretion of the board of directors, which
the courts will not review.2" The only limitation on the board of directors
is that they act within their statutory power and in conformance with the
rules and regulations of the hospital.2"
suspended or interrupted by some clearly and lawfully empowered authority. Id.
at 357, 67 N.W.2d at 250. (Emphasis added.)
In light of this holding, the court declared the following by-law invalid:
The board of trustees reserves the right to remove any member of the medical staff
or to deprive any physician or surgeon of the privileges of the hospital whenever, in
their sole judgment, the good of the hospital or of the patients therein demand it;
and it reserves the right at any time of making any changes in these rules, by
amendment, addition, substitution, repeal or revision, as in its judgment may seem
for the best interests of the hospital and those who are to become patients therein.
Id. at 353, 67 N.W.2d at 248.
28. Levin v. Doctors Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 953 (D.D.C. 1964), rev'd on other grounds,
354 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59,
63 (D.D.C. 1963); Edson v. Griffin Hosp., 21 Conn. Supp. 55, 144 A.2d 341 (1958);
Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961); West Coast Hosp.
Ass'n v. Hoare, 64 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1953) ; Natale v. Sisters of Mercy, 243 Iowa 582,
52 N.W.2d 701 (1952); Foote v. Community Hosp., 195 Kan. 385, 405 P.2d 423
(1965); Clark v. Physicians & Surgeons Hosp., Inc., 131 So. 2d 144 (La. Ct. App. 1961);
Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946); Van Campen v. Olean Gen.
Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y.S. 554, af'd per curiam, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E.
219 (1924); Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 395 Pa. 257, 149 A.2d 456
(1959); Khoury v. Community Memorial Hosp., Inc., 203 Va. 236, 123 S.E.2d 533
(1962); Henderson v. City of Knoxville, 157 Tenn. 477, 9 S.W.2d 697 (1928) (dictum);
State ex rel. Bronaugh v. City of Parkersburg, 148 W. Va. 568, 136 S.E.2d 783
(1964) (dictum); Johnson v. City of Ripon, 259 Wis. 84, 47 N.W.2d 328 (1951)
(dictum); State ex rel. Wolf v. La Crosse Lutheran Hosp. Ass'n, 181 Wis. 33, 193 N.W.
994 (1923); see Hughes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 289 Ky. 123, 158 S.W.2d 159
(1942); Strauss v. Marlboro County Gen. Hosp., 185 S.C. 425, 194 S.E. 65 (1937);
Weary v. Baylor Univ. Hosp., 360 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); North Broward
Hosp. Dist. v. Mizell, 148 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1962) (dictum); Alpert v. Board of Governors
of City Hosp., 286 App. Div. 542, 145 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1955) (dictum). But see Cowan
v. Gibson, 392 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1965); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192
A.2d 817 (1963).
29. Edson v. Griffin Hosp., supra note 28; Levin v. Sinai Hosp., supra note 28; Joseph
v. Passaic Hosp. Ass'n, 35 N.J. Super. 450, 114 A.2d 317 (Ch. 1955), aff'd, 26 N.J. 557,
141 A.2d 18 (1958); Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., supra note 28; Group Health
Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
Since most courts are unyielding in their application of the sound discretion rule,
often the only question in these cases is whether the hospital is public or private. E.g.,
West Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Hoare, supra note 28, at 295. This question is usually settled
by looking at the hospital's charter. If under the tests described ealier, the charter shows
the hospital to be private, the case is over.
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Once a court has found that a hospital is a private institution, not only
is it not required to notify a physician of the reasons for his dismissal from
the hospital staff, but it is not even required to notify the physician that he
has been dismissed.3" Thus, in Natale v. Sisters of Mercy," the court found
that no charge had been preferred against the plaintiff; no notice given
that his dismissal was being considered; no opportunity offered to appear
before the board; and no hearing given. The hospital did not even
extend plaintiff the courtesy of notifying him that he had been dismissed;
he learned of the dismissal through a friend." The court found that since
the hospital was a private institution, its internal management was en-
tirely within the power of its board of governors, which was not required
to assign any reasons--even unreasonable ones-for its actions. All decisions
were entirely within its sound discretion. 3
In Khoury v. Community Memorial Hosp.,'4 plaintiff complained that he
had not been given a fair hearing. The court, after determining that the
defendant was a private hospital, reasoned :
Since we have held that . . . [plaintiff] had no contractual, constitu-
tional or statutory right to the use of the hospital facilities, and since
the trustees acted in their sound discretion to deny him such use, we
are of the opinion that he was not entitled to a hearing with respect to
his exclusion therefrom. We need not consider, therefore, whether the
hearing which was accorded him was a fair one.' 5
It should be apparent from these cases that sound discretion actually
means absolute discretion. The vast majority of courts appear to look ini-
tially to the hospital's articles of incorporation to see if it is privately con-
trolled. If so, the board of directors has absolute discretion in managing the
hospital, including the right to decide who should and should not practice
medicine therein.
II. POTENTIAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO PHYSICIANS
DENIED STAFF MEMBERSHIP IN A PRIVATE HOSPITAL
Despite the general rule that the decision to preclude a physician from
practicing in a private hospital rests within the sound discretion of the hos-
pital's board of directors, numerous actions have been instituted against
private hospitals on a variety of legal theories.
30. Natale v. Sisters of Mercy, 243 Iowa 582, 52 N.W.2d 701 (1952).
31. Ibid.
32. Id. at 592, 52 N.W.2d at 707.
33. Natale v. Sisters of Mercy, supra note 30.
34. 203 Va. 236, 123 S.E.2d 533 (1962).
35. Id. at 242, 123 S.E.2d at 539
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A. Breach of Contract
Most courts recognize that the relationship between hospital and physi-
cian is contractual." Consequently, a generally recognized exception to the
rule of non-interference with the internal affairs of a private hospital is that
the hospital is liable for breach of its contract with the physician.17 In the
absence of or in addition to any express contractual provisions, the terms
of the contract are those provisions contained in the hospital's by-laws.' 8
A by-law often invoked requires that notice of charges, a hearing before
the board, and an opportunity to defend be given to a staff member before
he may be dismissed.' 9 If such a by-law exists, the courts usually enforce
it, preventing the removal of any physician without a hearing. In these
cases, the courts still adhere to the general rule that they cannot interfere
with the internal workings of a private corporation. However, relief is given
on the theory that the hospital has breached the terms of a contract.4"
36. E.g., Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 395 Pa. 257, 149 A.2d 456
(1959).
37. Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, supra note 36; Johnson v. City of
Ripon, 259 Wis. 84, 47 N.W.2d 328 (1951).
38. Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963); Levin v.
Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946); Raymond v. Cregar, 38 N.J. 472, 185
A.2d 856 (1962); Loewinthan v. Beth David Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 9 N.Y.S.2d 367
(1938); Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, supra note 36.
It is important to note that two sets of by-laws may be involved: those of the board
of directors and those of the medical staff. The board's by-laws are considered to be
superior to those of the staff. The Law in Brief, Hospitals, Sept. 1, 1963, p. 90. Thus,
recent cases have held that when the by-laws of the staff contain a requirement for a
hearing before dismissal and there is no such provision in the directors' by-laws, the
latter prevail and the physician or surgeon may be dismissed without a hearing. Manczur
v. Southside Hosp., 16 Misc. 2d 989, 183 N.Y.S.2d 960, (Sup. Ct. 1959). The Texas
court went so far as to hold that even when the staff by-laws have been approved by the
board, the board is not bound by them and need not follow any procedure which they
prescribe. Hershey, Hospital Law, Hospitals, April 16, 1963, p. 8. Contra, Berberian v.
Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, supra note 36.
39. Levin v. Sinai Hosp., supra note 38; Raymond v. Cregar, supra note 38; Loe-
winthan v. Beth David Hosp., supra note 38; Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp.
Ass'n, supra note 36. In some cases, this right is asserted in refusal-to-reappoint situa-
tions. Even if it is valid when the physician is removed prior to the expiration of his
contract, it would seem tenuous here. If a contract exists, it exists only for the time
period specified, which is usually one year. At the end of this period, the parties are free
to enter into a new agreement. The provisions of the contract, by which both were
bound while it was in effect, should not be carried over and applied to the period after
the contract's expiration. This, of course, assumes that there is no by-law provisions
calling for notice and hearing before failure to reappoint.
40. Cases cited note 39 supra. Thus the Pennsylvania court, in examining a set of by-
laws which required "adequate hearing and thorough investigation" by the executive com-
mittee of the general staff and an "appeal, with legal counsel, before a joint meeting" of
the staff's executive committee and the hospital's b6ard of directors, held that although
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Other by-laws are occasionally placed in issue. For example, the Phy-
sicians and Surgeons Hospital of Shreveport, Louisiana, had adopted the
following by-law:
Nothing in the by-laws shall be construed to mean that any physician
who is a member in good standing of the Shreveport Medical Society
can be prevented from visiting and treating patients in the P & S Hos-
pital although that physician may not be an active member of the staff
of said hospital. 1
Plaintiff, who was a member in good standing of the medical society, filed
suit for a judgment recognizing his right to treat his patients in the hospi-
tal, ordering his admission to the visiting staff, and granting injunctive relief
restraining the hospital from interfering in any way with the treatment of
his patients. The trial court dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
The Court of Appeal held that, in light of the by-law, the hospital could
not refuse access to the hospital to the plaintiff or his patients.42 While
holding that a private hospital was free to admit or refuse any physician,
the court said that it was bound by its by-laws."
Thus, on familiar contract principles, the courts have been willing to
dilute the absolute discretion of private hospitals. On its face, this appears
to be a significant exception to the sound discretion rule; however, this is
not so. First, most hospital staff contracts are for only a one-year period and
are renewable at the option of the hospital." Thus, a hospital may rid itself
of a physician simply by refusing to renew his contract. Second, at least
one court has held that a hospital may abolish a by-law under which a phy-
sician is asserting a claim even after the action has begun. Thus, when the
the hospital had had total discretion in this area, it had voluntarily restricted its freedom
of movement by means of this by-law, a contractual obligation which had to be followed
if a physician were to be removed. Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n.,
supra note 36, at 263, 149 A.2d at 459.
In a New Jersey case in which the plaintiff had been summarily removed from the
major surgical staff, he appealed on the basis of a by-law requiring a hearing at
which he might defend himself against such action. The court held that where a proce-
dure is stipulated in the by-laws, it must be followed, and non-compliance with it ren-
ders the board's action invalid even though the board had inherent power to take the
action in question. Jacobs v. Martin, 20 N.J. Super. 531, 537, 90 A.2d 151, 154 (Essex
County Ct. 1952).
41. Clark v. Physicians & Surgeons Hosp., Inc., 121 So. 2d 752, 753, (La. Ct. App.
1960).
42. Id. at 754.
43. Ibid. Obviously this court was using a third party beneficiary theory to bind the
hospital. Since the by-law granted rights to physicians not on the staff at the time of its
adoption, this is the only ground on which the court could grant relief.
44. See, e.g., Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 60 (D.D.C.
1963); Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298, 301 (1946) (dictum).
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Physicians and Surgeons Hospital case was remanded for trial on the merits,
the hospital had removed the by-law in question. The Court of Appeal held
that while a private hospital is bound by its by-laws, the by-laws are not
permanent and unchangeable4 The hospital created the right which the
physician was asserting, and it could remove it.
B. Interference with Business
Some cases have been instituted on the theory that the board's refusal
to appoint the physician or surgeon to the staff, or the decision to drop him
from it, was an attempt to interfere with his practice of medicine." How-
ever, this attempt to apply tort principles to the directors' actions has met
with little success.
Generally, one is free to select those with whom he will do business with-
out regard to his motive or the injury which it may inflict." Aside from
this, however, the courts have held that one may not intentionally cause
loss or damage to another in his business relations, with malice and without
justification." The rationale is that a person's business is a species of prop-
erty, and is entitled to protection. 9
45. Clark v. Physicians & Surgeons Hosp., Inc., 131 So. 2d 144 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
Maryland has indicated that its equity courts may properly oversee a physician's contract
rights in the hospital's constitution and by-laws, and grant injunctive relief if they are
being violated. They may also pass upon the validity of amendments to the by-laws
to determine the physician's right to relief under them. Levin v. Sinai Hosp., supra note
44, at 180, 46 A.2d at 301 (dictum).
46. Cowan v. Gibson, 392 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Mo. 1965); see Willis v. Santa Ana
Community Hosp. Ass'n, 58 Cal. 2d 806, 810, 376 P.2d 568, 570 (1962); cf. Harris v.
Thomas, 217 S.W. 1068 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
47. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 762 (1939) provides:
One who causes intended or unintended harm to another merely by refusing to
enter into a business relation with the other or to continue a business relation ter-
minable at his will is not liable for that harm if the refusal is not
(a) a breach of the actor's duty to the other arising from the nature of the ac-
tor's business or from a legislative enactment, or
(b) a means of accomplishing an illegal effect on competition, or
(c) part of a concerted refusal by a combination of persons of which he is a
member.
This is true even though the actor does so maliciously with the sole intent of injuring
the plaintiff. Id. at § 762, comment c.
48. E.g., Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 113 N.J.L. 582, 175 At. 62 (Ct. Err. & App.
1934).
49. E.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889). See note 10 supra and ac-
companying text.
The right to conduct one's business without the wrongful interference of others is one
that has been recognized by the common law at least since 1621. Garret v. Taylor, Cro.
Jac. 567, 79 Eng. Rep. 485 (K.B. 1621). An action will lie for intentional interference
with business if the actor's conduct was malicious, unjustifiable, and results in damage
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Courts have been reluctant to apply this rule to cases based on a hos-
pital's refusal to admit a doctor to staff membership. The reasoning behind
this reluctance is as follows: plaintiff must have been injured by a tortious
act if he is to recover; the act complained of is simply the refusal of defend-
ant board of directors to admit plaintiff physician to the staff of the hos-
pital; however, defendant hospital is a private institution; admission to the
staff of a private hospital is within the sound discretion of the board of
directors; therefore, since the board was at liberty to accept or reject plain-
tiff's application in its discretion, there was no tortious interference with
his business.5" Obviously, the key to denial of relief here, as in nearly all
private hospital cases, is the court's holding that admission to the staff is
within the board's sound discretion. It is this factor which makes the
board's action not tortious.
However, a recent Missouri case, Cowan v. Gibson,"1 alleged an in-
terference with plaintiff's business by the doctors and board members
of a private hospital in refusing to renew his annual appointment.52 The
case came before the Missouri Supreme Court on an appeal from an
order sustaining defendant's demurrer. The court held that the hospital's
private status was immaterial, and ruled that if the allegations were true,
this was not the exercise of any discretion-much less "sound" discretion.53
to the plaintiff. Note, 56 YALE L.J. 885 (1947). If the malice involved is more than
merely the intentional doing of a harmful act without justification or excuse, and amounts
to actual malevolence or ill will, exemplary damages may be recovered in addition to
actual damages. Pratt v. British Medical Ass'n, [1919] 1 K.B. 244.
50. See cases cited note 28 supra.
51. 392 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1965).
52. Staff appointments conveniently run from year to year so that under tradi-
tional theories, if the board wanted-for any reason-to be rid of a certain physician,
they had only to wait for his one year contract to expire. See cases cited note 44 supra.
53. Cowan v. Gibson, 392 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1965) (by implication). After stating
the general rule, text accompanying note I supra, the court went on:
In view of this admittedly applicable general rule the problem upon this appeal
is whether . . . there are any allegations which would prima facie remove the
cause from the operation of the general rule and therefore entitle him to a hearing
... upon its merits.
All in all, as a matter of substance there is more involved here than the hos-
pital's mere denial of the doctor's application for reinstatement to staff and hos-
pital privileges, it is asserted that he lost these but in addition the allegations in
their totality charge the tortious conduct of an improper interference with the plain-
tiff's busnes and profession all to his financial loss and to at least the financial
benefit of the individual doctors. Cowan v. Gibson, supra at 308-09.
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1. Interference with Contract
The tort of interference with contract dates from the early common
law. 4 The rule has developed that an action will lie for an unprivileged
inducement of one of the parties to a contract not to keep his part of the
bargain."5
54. PROSSER, TORTS 950 (3d ed. 1964).
55. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 766 (1939). The principle had its beginning in Lum-
ley v. Gye, 2 El. & BI. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853). Miss Johanna Wagner, a
well known opera singer, was engaged by the plaintiff to perform for a season exclusively
at the Queen's Theatre, London, of which he was the manager. Before the season
opened, the defendant persuaded her to break her contract, and in consequence she never
appeared for the plaintiff. He accordingly sued the defendant for damages, but the claim
was resisted on the ground that Miss Wagner's position as an artiste lay outside the
purview of the action for enticement which was confined to "servants" within the
meaning of the Statute of Labourers. This argument was rejected in favor of the broader
view that any malicious interference with contractual relations was an actionable wrong,
and it did not matter whether the servant had repudiated the contract before commenc-
ing his performance or thereafter. This decision was subsequently approved by the Court
of Appeal, and later expanded to contracts other than for personal service.
Again, the courts are interested in protecting that property interest which the parties
to a contract have. Downey v. United Weatherproofing, 363 Mo. 852, 858, 253 S.W.2d
976, 980 (1953). A contract is seen as a right that is good against the world, one in
which both parties have a stake, and to the performance of which both parties are
entitled. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 54, at 954.
Virtually any type of contact will suffice for the purpose, so long as it is not illegal
or void as against public policy. But the contract need not be enforceable. The courts
apparently assume that even if a contract is voidable, the nature of man is such that he
will do that which he has promised to do, though the law would not punish him for its
breach. Id. at 955.
Interference with contract actions generally make malice an element of the action.
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 766, comment m, special note (1939). However, the malice
required need not amount to spite or malevolence, but merely purposeful interference
without justification. While this definition has thus eliminated spite as a requirement,
it is still important as bearing on the actor's motive. FLEMINo, TORTS 716-17 (1957).
Spite may also help to determine whether the defendant was acting under any of the
privileges or justifications, as these depend largely on his motives. "If the actor does
not act for the purpose of advancing the interest for the protection of which the privilege
is given, he is not exercising the privilege and is not protected by it." RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 766, comment m (1939). Thus, even though a privilege is claimed or may be
plausible, if it be shown that the defendant was actually motivated by pure malevolence,
the privilege is disallowed. Id. at §§ 766, comment m, 768.
There are no hard and fast rules, as in defamation, for determining whether or not
a privilege exists. All that can be said is that several factors must be taken into ac-
count and balanced against each other. Factors which are deemed important are
(1) the nature of the actor's conduct, (2) the nature of the expectancy with which his
conduct interferes, (3) the relations between the parties, (4) the interest sought to be
advanced by the actor and (5) the social interests in protecting the expectancy on the one
hand and the actor's freedom of action on the other. FLEMING, op. eit. supra at 718.
The burden of proving justification rests on the defendant. The fact that he intentionally
interfered with the performance of a contract is prima facie evidence of liability. PROS-
sER, op. cit. supra note 54, at 967.
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The term "inducing breach of contract" is not limited to those situations
in which A convinces B not to carry out his bargain with C, but also in-
cludes any act of A which has the intended effect of preventing, impairing,
or burdening the performance of the contract. 6 Thus, the action has been
allowed when it is the plaintiff himself who has been prevented, by exclu-
sion from the premises or deprivation of essential tools or machinery, from
performing the contract and obtaining its benefits."
However, the majority of courts have refused to allow such an action
based on a denial of hospital staff membership. The courts refuse to exam-
ine the hospital's motives as long as the acts complained of do not violate
the hospital's charter. 8 The decision of the board of directors is a matter
in their sound discretion, and is not open to judicial inquiry.
At least one court,59 however, has been willing to look beyond the "sound
discretion" rule and hold actionable an allegation that the defendants con-
spired "to interfere with the contractual rights between plaintiff and his
patients, and to force plaintiff's said patients to discontinue their contractual
arrangements with plaintiff and seek the services of defendants."60
2. Interference with Prospective Advantage
Closely analogous to inducing breach of contract is the tort of interference
with prospective economic advantage. While the courts were long reluctant
to protect economic relations unformalized by contract, cases started to
appear in England in the mid-1800's which recognized the cause of action.
By 1893, it was firmly established. 1 The principle was adopted by the
56. FLEMING, op. cit. supra note 55, at 714; see RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 766, com-
ment d. (1939).
57. FLEMING, op. cit. supra note 55, at 715; PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 54, at 959.
58. The issue is never even joined. The courts first decide that the hospital is
"private"; they then announce the existence of the "sound discretion" rule. Applying
this rule to the case at hand, they hold the dismissal from the staff (or refusal to appoint)
was within the board's discretion and thus there is no tort issue left in the case. For a
good example of this simplistic reasoning see the unpublished trial court opinion in
Cowan v. Gibson, reproduced in Brief for Appellant, pp. 6-9, Cowan v. Gibson, 392
S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1965).
"... attorney's [sic] for the plaintiff . . . concede that the Lockwood Memorial
Hospital Association was ... a private hospital.
"... the members of the Board of Directors of a private hospital may use theirdiscretion in determining what doctors may practice in that hospital.
"... But in a situation such as we have here, it would seem to me that it would
prevert [pervert?] and destroy the very meaning of the word discretion to hold
that the exercise of discretion . . . might be reviewed or controlled by this or any
other tribunal." Id. at 8-9.
59. Cowan v. Gibson, 392 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1965).
60. Id. at 309. (Emphasis added by the court.)
61. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 54, at 974. In that year, the Court of Queen's
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American courts62 and is now established as stated in section 766 of the
Restatement of Torts.3
To recover under this theory, it must be shown (1) that the defendant
acted maliciously, at least in the sense of intending to interfere," (2) that
but for the defendant's action, a contract would have been entered into,"5
and (3) that such contracts were not entered into, with consequent damage
to the plaintiff."
Since competition is a valuable and protected interest, most decisions have
turned on the defendant's motive. If he is actually-and honestly-engag-
ing in a competitive enterprise, courts are unlikely to find a tort. But if the
motive for his interference with the business of the plaintiff is not so much
to further his own economic interests as to harm those of the plaintiff, he
is likely to be held liable.'
Bench decided Temperton v. Russell, (18931 1 Q.B. 715, 62 L.J.Q.B. 412, in which it
declared that the principles of liability for interference with contract extended beyond
existing contractual relations, and that a similar action would lie for interference with
relations which were merely prospective or potential. But see FLEMINO, Op. cit. supra
note 55, at 721:
Not until the end of the nineteenth century did the courts finally commit them-
selves to the view that, in the absence of conspiracy (involving a combination) or
the use of illegal means, no liability is incurred for intentionally procuring others to
refuse to make or renew contracts with the plaintiff, even if such action is taken with
the sole aim of thereby harming him in his trade or employment. At one time,
there was some support for the broad proposition that "he that hinders another
in his trade or livelihood is liable to an action for so hindering him," but it is now
settled that interference with economic relations, which are merely in prospect and
not yet cemented by contract, is not actionable at the suit of the person disap-
pointed unless inherently unlawful means are employed for the purpose.
62. E.g., Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947); Shell Oil Co. v. State
Tire & Oil Co., 126 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1942); Buckley & Scott Utilities, Inc. v. Petro-
leum Heat & Power Co., 313 Mass. 498, 48 N.E.2d 154 (1943).
63. The drafters of the Restatement took the position that while protection should
be greater in those cases in which actual contracts were in existence, "some protection
is appropriate against unjustified interference with reasonable expectancies of commer-
cial relations even when an existing contract is lacking." RESTATnmENT, TORTS § 766,
comment b (1939). Thus, while there is no general duty to do business with a person,
there is a general duty not to interfere with his reasonable expectancies. Downey v.
United Weatherproofing, Inc., 363 Mo. 852, 858, 253 S.W.2d 976, 980 (1953).
64. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 55, at 976.
65. Goldman v. Feinberg, 130 Conn. 671, 675, 37 A.2d 355, 356 (1944).
66. Ibid. As in interference with contract, there are also certain privileged situations
in which one may interfere with prospective contracts without incurring liability.
PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 55, at 977. The two actions are quite similar. The interest
in free competition allows a certain freedom to interfere with relations as yet uncemented
by contract. Id. at 979; Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., [1889] 23
Q.B.D. 598, aff'd, 1892 A.C. 25.
67. Pratt v. British Medical Ass'n, E1919] 1 K.B. 244. The action will be privileged if
the defendant's primary purpose is to further a legitimate interest. This assumes, of
course, that illegal means are not used. No matter how praiseworthy the objective, illegal
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In an action based on denial of staff membership, the difficulty of a
plaintiff's case lies in the first requirement-that defendant acted ma-
liciously. Since, in similar actions to obtain staff membership, the courts
have foreclosed an inquiry into the hospital's motives, it is doubtful that
they would allow a similar inquiry in an action for interference with pros-
pective advantage. This is so even if the actions of the board of directors
were aimed at damaging the economic interests of the plaintiff rather than
furthering those of the hospital.
C. Concerted Wrongful Activities
1. Common Law Conspiracy
The action for damages caused by a conspiracy developed at common
law as one of the actions on the case." The gist of the action is not the
conspiracy itself, since the simple agreement to commit a tort in the future
cannot be a tort. Rather, something must be done pursuant to the agree-
ment which, by itself, would create a cause of action against the individual
actor. "It is only where means are employed, or purposes are accomplished,
which are themselves tortious, that the conspirators who have not acted
but who have promoted the act will be held liable."69
Several actions have been brought on the conspiracy theory; the results
are varied. In Loewinthan v. Beth David Hosp.,'0 plaintiff alleged a con-
spiracy to remove him from the staff of defendant hospital. The New York
court refused to allow the action, holding that "the liability is for damages
in the commission of a wrongful act, or of a legal act by wrongful means,
and not for the agreement to commit it."'" This is, of course, the traditional
definition of conspiracy. However, the court proceeded to interpret the ac-
tion out of existence by holding that "where the conspiracy results in the
commission of that which would be an actionable tort, whether committed
by one or by many, then the cause of action is the tort, not the conspiracy.""
Thus, while initially recognizing the general definition of conspiracy, the
court held that if anyone actually comes within the definition, then the
action should be not for the conspiracy, but for the tortious act."
means cannot be justified. Ibid. The justification interposed must be as broad as the
act sought to be justified, and such justification must be one the law will recognize.
68. Rosen v. Alside, Inc., 248 S.W.2d 638, 643 (Mo. 1952).
69. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 54, at 260.
70. 9 N.Y.S.2d 367 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
71. Id. at 373.
72. Ibid.
73. It is not clear from the opinion whether the court would have allowed an action
against all of the conspirators as joint tortfeasors, since this was not pleaded. However,
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Cases arose in California and Missouri involving conspiracies among the
staff physicians and the hospitals' boards of directors to keep the plaintiff
physicians from obtaining staff membership."' Both courts refused to allow
this to be carried out under the guise of sound discretion, and ruled against
the hospitals.
The California court, after finding that the plaintiff's credentials were
in order, held that a cause of action was stated when it was "alleged that
a physician of highest qualifications is denied access to necessary hospital
facilities as the result of a conspiracy designed to restrain competition and
deprive him of his practice in order to benefit competing members of the
conspiracy."75
The Missouri court discussed the general rule regarding the operation
of private hospitals and indicated that while it would abide by the rule in
appropriate situations, it would not follow the general rule blindly in every
case involving private hospitals. The pleadings of the plaintiff alleged a con-
spiracy which was causing substantial harm to the plaintiff, and, thus, he
had stated a valid cause of action."6 These courts appear willing to examine
a hospital's "sound discretion" in light of the normal expectations of reason-
able men, and to award damages to a physician for injury arising from a
conspiracy on the part of a hospital, its directors, and staff, if, in fact, a
conspiracy can be proved.
2. Unjustified Refusal to Deal
It will be noted that in the rules defining the common law action of con-
spiracy, some tortious act is required." If no one commits a tortious act,
or if all of the legal acts put together do not add up to a wrongful result,
the action is dismissed.
Of late, it has been recognized that in some instances the conspiracy itself
might be wrongful-even though no member of it does any tortious act-
simply because the action taken by the group against outsiders is unjustifi-
able." Section 765 of the Restatement of Torts states:
the court did indicate that the only time it would entertain a civil action for conspiracy
would be when the agreement is to violate the criminal law. Ibid. (dictum).
74. Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n, 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d 568
(1962); Cowan v. Gibson, 392 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1965).
75. Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n, supra note 74, at 810, 376 P.2d
at 570.
76. Cowan v. Gibson, 392 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Mo. 1965).
77. Note 69 supra and accompanying text.
78. RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 765 (1939).
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Persons who cause harm to another by a concerted refusal in their
business to enter into or to continue business relations with him are
liable to him for that harm, even though they would not be liable for
similar conduct without concert, if their concerted refusal is not justified
under the circumstances."9
Under this rule, the acts of the conspirators need not be legally wrongful;
it is enough if they are unjustified under the circumstances. The determi-
nation of justification is a balancing process which includes the following
factors: (1) the objects and interests of the conspirators, (2) the hardship
caused the plaintiff and his opportunities for mitigating it, (3) the appro-
priateness of the means chosen to reach the conspirators' desired ends, and
the availability of less harmful means, (4) the relationship between the
conspirators and the plaintiff and their relative economic power, and (5)
the effects of the conspiracy on the societal interest in business enterprise
and competition."0
Only one case involving the denial of hospital facilities has considered
section 765. In Blank v. Palo Alto-Stanford Hosp. Center,"1 defendant hos-
pital center entered into a contract with defendant doctors which gave the
latter complete supervision of the center's radiology department, including
the exclusive right to perform diagnostic radiology. Plaintiff, a radiology
specialist, was thus prohibited from performing diagnostic radiology in the
79. Id. § 765(1). (Emphasis added.)
80. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 765 (1939). None of these factors is superior to any
other, nor can a result be reached by examining the situation and adding up the factors
for each side. The Restatement makes it clear that these factors are to be used merely
as guidelines in determining whether a given action is justifiable or not. Thus, it is
felt that no matter how laudable may be the interest which the conspirators are endeavor-
ing to advance, a "concerted refusal to deal is not justified if it goes far beyond the
promotion of that interest and is unduly oppressive or is otherwise prejudicial to a para-
mount social interest." Id. at comment d. Clearly, if such a refusal is based solely on
spite or ill will toward the plaintiff, the action is not justified.
It must be emphasized at this point that one interest to which the courts apparently
accord great consideration is that of advancing the business of the conspirators. Ibid.
This goes back to an English case, Sorrell v. Smith, [1925] A.C. 700, in which the House
of Lords held that if the real purpose of the combination is not to injure another, but
to forward or defend the trade of those who enter into it, no wrong is committed and
no action will lie, although damage to another ensues, provided that the purpose is not
effected by illegal means. The American courts will allow such business competition
as justification even though the damage to the plaintiff caused by the conspiracy was
intended as the means for advancing that interest. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 765,
comment d (1939). The English courts take the same view but seem to carry it a little
further. They will not uphold an action against the combination unless its purpose is
"wholly destructive, by prevailnig community standards." FLEMiNG, op. cit. supra note
55, at 729.
81. 234 Cal. App. 2d 377, 44 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1965).
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center, although he was allowed to read any of the X-ray films of the depart-
ment if requested to do so by a patient. The trial court, deciding for the de-
fendants, made no finding as to whether the hospital was public or private
since it found that the contract between the defendants was a reasonable
method for the hospital to operate its radiology department. Plaintiff, in re-
questing the court to rule on the reasonableness of the hospital's action, re-
lied, inter alia, on section 765. The appellate court upheld the finding of the
trial court that the action of the hospital in entering into the contract was
reasonable. Among other factors, the decision was justified by the fact that
the contract method of operating the radiology department assured the hos-
pital of the immediate availability of professional radiologists. The court
was impressed by the additional finding that if the department were open
to all qualified radiologists, substantial complications in operation would re-
sult which would interfere with proper patient care. Further, there was no
material damage to the public resulting from the contract method of operat-
ing the radiology department. The significance of this opinion as a pos-
sible inroad into the sound discretion rule is limited by the fact that no
attempt was made to decide whether the hospital facility was public or pri-
vate. The court simply assumed "for purposes of this appeal" 2 that a pri-
vate hospital did not have an unrestricted right to enter into such a
contract.8 3 Furthermore, the court did not attempt to determine the justifi-
cation for the hospital's acts in light of the five factors suggested in the Re-
statement.
3. Antitrust Violations
When a common law action is brought against the parties to a conspiracy
to create a monopoly in the medical field, the plaintiff may be allowed to
recover.84 But when the action is based on antitrust legislation-state or
federal-many problems arise.
Actions based upon the Sherman Act are rare. Because the Supreme
Court has yet to hold that the practice of medicine can be "interstate com-
merce," it does not come within the terms of the Act."5 However, section
82. Id. at 385, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
83. Had the trial court made the specific finding that the center was a private
facility, it is open to question whether the court would have reached the issue of the
reasonableness of the hospital's action.
84. Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n, 58 Cal. 2d 806, 26 Cal. Rptr. 640,
376 P.2d 568 (1962); Cowan v. Gibson, 392 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1965).
85. The "interstate commerce" requirement of the Sherman Act is the most serious
obstacle to the effective use of this remedy, which has been tried only in cases involving
group health associations. Few such associations maintain large, multi-state practices. For
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3, which applies the Act to the District of Columbia,"6 does not require a
finding of interstate commerce. No suits which involve hospital staff privi-
leges have been brought in the District on a Sherman Act theory. However,
a brief examination of the past application of antitrust principles to the
practice of medicine in the District serves to indicate how such a case would
probably fare.
The Court of Appeals has twice held the practice of medicine to be in-
cluded within the word "trade."8 " These cases involved an attempt by the
American Medical Association to eliminate the local group health plan.
However, on appeal, the Supreme Court refused both times to consider
the question." The Court said that inasmuch as petitioner Group Health,
Inc. was engaged in doing business and the petition alleged a conspiracy
to restrain that business, it was unnecessary to decide whether the practice
of medicine was "trade." 9 The Court further noted that it was meaning-
less, for the purposes of the Act, to distinguish between "business" in the
traditional commercial sense and the rendition of medical services. "Whether
the conspiracy was aimed at restraining or destroying competition, or had
as its purpose a restraint of the free availability of medical or hospital
services in the market, [it is] ... within the scope of the statute.""0
example, in United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952),
the Court concluded:
The Government did show that Oregon Physicians' Service made a number of pay-
ments to out-of-state doctors and hospitals, presumably for treatment of policy-
holders who happened to remove or temporarily to be away from Oregon when
need for service arose. These were, however, few, sporadic and incidental. Id. at
338-39.
Thus, the federal antitrust act will not be of great assistance unless the government does
away with the "few, sporadic and incidental" rule, or the plans are set up on a multi-
state basis.
86. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1964).
87. United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), af/'d,
317 U.S. 519 (1943); United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 644 (1940).
88. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943). In 1950,
the Court once again refused the opportunity to "intimate an opinion on the correct-
ness of the application of the term [trade] to the professions." United States v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 492 (1950).
89. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, supra note 88, at 528.
90. Id. at 529.
An action brought under the Cartwright Antitrust Act was dismissed by the California
court on the ground that the professions were not specifically mentioned in the act. If the
legislature did not specifically say that the professions constituted "trade" the court
would not do so. Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n, 58 Cal. 2d 806, 809,
26 Cal. Rptr. 640, 642, 376 P.2d 568, 570 (1962) (recovery allowed under common law
conspiracy theory).
The Maryland court, while suggesting that a conspiracy to monopolize the field of
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Thus, if a case were brought against a combination the purpose of which
was to keep physicians off the staffs of District hospitals, public or private,
the Court would be likely to uphold a verdict for the physicians on the
ground that the purpose of the conspiracy was to restrain the free avail-
ability of medical services by refusing staff positions to the plaintiff-doctors.
If the Court were to recognize that the practice of medicine can be inter-
state commerce, the same principles would be applied to the other sections
of the Sherman Act.
In contrast to the lack of direct federal precedent is the landmark Wash-
ington case of Group Health Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc'y.1 The
local medical society had conspired with, among others, a public hospital
and a private hospital to restrain trade in the field of contract medicine. 2
The part played by the two hospitals was the adoption of rules and by-laws
which required membership in the medical society in order to gain admis-
sion to their staffs. The society, for its part, refused to admit anyone who
was a member of Group Health.9" The court held that under the state con-
stitution,"4 which was merely a codification of the common law on the sub-
ject,9" three elements must be present in order to constitute a prohibited
monopoly. There must be (1) an agreement to (2) fix prices, limit pro-
duction, or regulate the transportation of (3) some product or commodity."0
Turning to the dictionary for a definition of "product," the court found
that Webster included "the products of the brain"9" and concluded that
whether this definition should be used was to be decided in the context of
the underlying objective of the constitutional provision.
As our constitutional provision bespeaks the common law, so it should
be permitted to afford the same protection and serve the same broad
public interest which is available at common law. Monopolies affecting
medicine might be contrary to the prohibition of monopolies in the State Declaration of
Rights, held that since the hospital was not destroying competition or restraining the
free availability of hospital or medical services, no violation was proved. Levin v. Sinai
Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946).
91. 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
92. Contract medicine is a type of risk pooling arrangement whereby a group of doc-
tors agrees to take care of all the medical needs of a group of people for a stated periodic
fee.
93. Group Health Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 593,
237 P.2d 737, 742 (1951).
94. WAS. CONST. art. 12, § 22.
95. Group Health Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 638, 237
P.2d 737, 765 (1951).
96. Id. at 635, 237 P.2d at 764.
97. Id. at 637, 237 P.2d at 765.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1966/iss4/5
HOSPITAL STAFF MEMBERSHIP
price or production in essential service trades and professions can be
as harmful to the public interest as monopolies in the sale or produc-
tion of tangible goods. The constitutional provision was designed to
safeguard this public interest from whatever direction it may be as-
sailed. The language used must therefore be liberally construed with
that end in view.'
The court further noted that the term "restraint of trade" was applied to
the practice of medicine at common law." Thus, it appeared to construct
a framework for holding both defendant hospitals guilty of establishing a
prohibited monopoly. Under the principles stated above, the court did find
the rules adopted by the public hospital "unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious
and discriminatory." However, it held that the private hospital-which
was, after all, a private corporation-could adopt, in its sound discretion,
any rules which it desired.'
III. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND EQUAL PROTECTION
While the traditional concepts of corporation law have stood as an im-
pregnable wall allowing the directors of a private hospital complete freedom
in managing the internal affairs of the corporation, a small but important
breakthrough, based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, has occurred in two cases.' In each case, the court found that the
state or federal government, or both, had become so "involved in the
conduct of . ..otherwise private bodies that their activities are also the
activities of these governments and performed under their aegis,"'0 2 that
the action of the hospitals constituted state action.
A. Hill-Burton Act
In Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.,' a large amount of
federal funds had been given, through the state treasurer's office, to the
defendant under the Hill-Burton hospital construction act. 4 In its appli-
98. Id. at 638, 237 P.2d at 765. (Emphasis added.)
99. Ibid.
100. Id. at 667, 237 P.2d at 780. While it is enough for our purposes to indicate the
difference in treatment accorded the two hospitals, it should be noted that all of the other
defendants were enjoined from conspiring to deny the plaintiffs staff membership.
101. Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
102. Id. at 966; accord, Eaton v. Grubbs, supra note 101, at 715.
103. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
104. Pursuant to the Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1965), grants are made by
the federal government to public and private hospitals to assist in the construction of
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cation for the funds, the hospital had specifically stated that citizens of the
community would be discriminated against solely because of their race.'
In accord with this statement, the hospital denied the use of its facilities
to the plaintiffs-Negro physicians and their patients. The plaintiffs filed
suit against the hospital, claiming that it was actually an arm of the state and
that its acts were thus within the ambit of the fourteenth amendment. The
District Court held that the hospital was not subject to the anti-discrimina-
tion requirements of the fourteenth amendment because it had not become
an instrumentality of the state. "' In reversing the decision, Judge Sobeloff
held that it was unnecessary for the hospital actually to have become an
"instrumentality of government;" it was sufficient if the government had
become so involved in the operations of the hospital that the hospital's activ-
ities were also those of the government and were performed "under its
aegis."'07 Using this criterion, the court found sufficient involvement and
granted relief.
The court rejected the argument that mere donation of funds does not
constitute control, and relied on the extensive system of regulations which
the government required before funds would be granted."' With this sys-
tem of regulations in mind-plus the large amount of federal money in-
volved-Judge Sobeloff declared that the government had become so in-
volved in the actions of the hospital that the actions of the two were no
longer distinguishable.
Two additional theories were recognized by the court. The intent of the
Hill-Burton Act was to establish a statewide system of hospitals (in each
state) to satisfy the needs of the people, which were not being met under
existing circumstances. To this end, if a state desired to receive funds for
hospital construction, it was required to designate a state agency to oversee
the operation, set up regulations, and disperse the money. Under this the-
ory, a state, upon joining the program, assumed the responsibility of plan-
ning an adequate hospital program for all of its citizens. If this was done,
new hospital facilities. Grants are made by the Surgeon-General in accordance with a
statewide plan submitted by an authorized state agency after it has made an inventory
of existing facilities, determined hospital construction needs, and developed construction
priorities according to federal standards.
105. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 962 (4th Cir. 1963).
As originally enacted in 1946, the Hill-Burton Act permitted individual hospitals to
discriminate on the basis of race if they submitted a statement to that effect in advance.
To the extent that the Act allowed this, it was declared to be unconstitutional in this case.
Id. at 969.
106. Id. at 966.
107. Ibid.
108. Id. at 967. For a discussion of this argument see note 6 supra.
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it mattered not that the instrumentalities chosen were "private" rather than
"public"-they were all so involved with the state as to fall within the
prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment.'
In addition, reservation of control under the Hill-Burton Act is left with
the states. Included in this control is the fact that states must pass legisla-
tion requiring each hospital to meet minimum standards before any federal
grants can be made.
B. Reverter Clause
In Eaton v. Grubbs,"' the situation was quite different. First, the hospital
had received very little money from the government;... second, an action
had already been brought against the hospital, and it had prevailed on the
strength of the private corporation theory."' However, both Simkins and
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority"'. had been decided prior to the
bringing of the second Eaton action." 4 In Burton, the Supreme Court
found, under the particular facts involved in that case, that the action of a
privately-owned restaurant located in a public building constituted state
action."' In Simkins, the Fourth Circuit stated that much doubt had been
109. Id. at 968. As this issue goes to press, we note that the Fourth Circuit-again
in an opinion by Judge Sobeloff-has further tightened its anti-discrimination require-
ments. In Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 35 U.S.L. WEEK
2526 (4th Cir. Mar. 9, 1967) (hospital received large amount of Hill-Burton funds),
the court held that if there are no Negroes on the hospital staff and a qualified Negro
applies, there is a prima facie inference of discrimination if he is rejected by a secret vote
taken without a hearing.
110. 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964).
111. Id. at 713.
112. Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hosp., 261 F.2d 521
(4th Cir. 1958).
113. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). In Burton a Negro plaintiff was refused service in a
privately-owned restaurant which was located in a parking garage owned and operated by
the Wilmington Parking Authority. The Authority had been created by the City of Wil-
mington pursuant to a Delaware statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, §§ 501-515 (1953).
The statutory purpose of the Authority was to provide adequate parking facilities for the
convenience of the public and thereby relieve the parking crisis, which threatened the
welfare of the community. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 501(7) (1953). The court found
that the denial of service to the plaintiff constituted a denial of equal protection through
state action. The court relied on the fact that the land and building were publicly owned,
and the fact that the costs of land acquisition, construction, and maintenance were de-
frayed entirely out of public monies.
114. Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710, 712 (4th Cir. 1964).
115. While we have attempted a brief statement of the Burton case in the text, we
recognize the danger of this. As a recent commentator has stated, "it would be futile, in-
deed it would completely disregard the Court's admonition, to attempt to state the princi-
ple of law that emerges from or governs this case. This is its disturbing feature." Lewis,
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority-A Case Without Precedent, 61 COLUm. L.
R v. 1458, 1462 (1961).
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cast on the validity of the first Eaton case by the Burton decision."' Soon
afterward, Eaton again filed suit; it was held that the first case did not con-
stitute res judicata, because of the change of circumstances brought about
by Burton and Simkins."'
In Eaton, the land upon which the hospital stood had been donated by
the state. The original grant contained a reverter clause which provided
that if the land ever ceased to be used as a hospital, it would revert to the
state. The court found the reverter clause, by which the state exercised con-
trol over the hospital, to be a most significant factor. It held that while a
purely private hospital-i.e., one with no contacts with the state-might
be able to do as it pleased, this particular hospital was under state control.
It was not free, without suffering a reversion of the land, to cease being a
hospital if it objected to the rules that the state imposed."1
The court further indicated that while this hospital did not participate
in the HilU-Burton program, as did the Moses H. Cone Hospital in Simkins,
it was still subject to all of the regulations set up by the state agency re-
sponsible for administering Hill-Burton. 9 Since it was subject to those
regulations, even though it did not receive any assistance under the pro-
gram, this involvement between the state and the hospital at least con-
tributed to the finding of state action. 2
If this factor were given controlling importance, any hospital in a state
which is participating in the Hill-Burton program may be held to be so
involved with the state as to come within the prohibitions of the fourteenth
amendment. No action at all would be required on the part of a hospital
to have it declared intimately connected with the state. It could be so found
even though it had accepted no funds or assistance of any kind and had
expressly disclaimed any desire to participate. The only requirement would
be the desire of the state to participate in the national program. When this
factor is present, all hospitals in the state would be involved in the state's
master plan, and their action would be state action. In such a state, the
"private" hospitals would no longer be able to exercise total discretion, at
least to exclude Negro physicians solely on the basis of race.
CONCLUSION
It is no longer open to question that to practice medicine successfully, a
doctor requires access to hospital facilities.' The complexity of modem
116. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 968 (4th Cir. 1963).
117. Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710, 712 (4th Cir. 1964).
118. See id. at 713.
119. Ibid.
120. Id. at 715.
121. Rosner v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 58 Cal. 2d 592, 598, 375 P.2d 431, 434
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medicine and advanced diagnostic techniques makes the use of hospital facil-
ities mandatory for proper diagnosis and treatment of disease.122 But in or-
der to take advantage of these facilities, a physician or surgeon must be on
the medical staff of a hospital.12 If a physician is not allowed to use hos-
pital facilities, his medical career is greatly limited.'24 His income may drop
precipitously.25 and he may become nothing more than a referral service
for those physicians who do have staff privileges." In addition to its
monetary value, staff membership is a matter of prestige." 7 A physician
gains prestige with every appointment he receives and, conversely, loses it
with every rejection or expulsion. Rejections are permanent blots on a
physician's record which follow him wherever he goes."' Each hospital
to which he applies for staff membership wants to know what action has
been taken by other hospitals, and each rejection, for whatever reason, is
held against him." 9
Furthermore, there are some situations in which staff membership in a
particular hospital is crucial, as in a town with only one hospital. In such
a case, if the physician is refused staff privileges, he is out of a job. The
board of directors of that one hospital has the power of professional life
(1962); Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 715, 345 P.2d 93, 97
(1959); State ex rel. Bronaugh v. City of Parkersburg, 148 W. Va. 568, 573, 136 S.E.2d
783, 787 (1964).
122. Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., supra note 121; State ex rel. Bronaugh v.
City of Parkersburg, supra note 121.
123. Alpert v. Board of Governors of City Hosp., 286 App. Div. 542, 145 N.Y.S.2d
534 (1955); Duson v. Poage, 318 S.W.2d 89, 98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Group Health
Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 604, 237 P.2d 737, 755 (1951).
124. Cases cited note 121 supra.
125. Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 394, 192 A.2d 817, 820 (1963);
Horty, The Legal Right of Physicians to Hospital Privileges, 44 CH. B. REcoRD 373
(1963); Ludlam, Medical Staff Privileges-Legal Snares for the Hospitals, Hospitals,
Aug. 1, 1964, p. 38.
126. Brief for Relator, p. 8, State ex rel. Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 149
W. Va. 229, 140 S.E.2d 457 (1965).
127. Horty, supra note 125, at 373.
128. E.g., Rosner v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 58 Cal. 2d 592, 375 P.2d 431 (1962).
In this case, the board of directors refused to accept plaintiff largely because of his
record at other hospitals.
With respect to temperamental suitability, the board found that Dr. Rosner was
"unable to get along with" the chief of surgery at City of Hope Hospital, had
"unpleasantries" at Patton State Hospital, was "unable to get along at" Bella Vista
Hospital, had "trouble" or was "unable to get along with" anesthesiologists at two
other hospitals, and was "unable to get along with" the medical staff at Levine Hos-
pital of Hayward. Id. at 595, 375 P.2d at 432.
129. At this point it should be recalled that a private hospital need not assign a
reason for dropping a staff member or refusing to appoint a physician to its staff; con-
sequently, the record may show only that the doctor in question has either been rejected
or excluded from staff membership.
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and death over every physician or surgeon who wishes to remain in the
community."' The specialist may also find himself at the mercy of one hos-
pital, even if he decides to practice in a relatively large community, because
there may be few hospitals which are properly equipped to allow him to
practice his specialty.
However, there are countervailing arguments for giving a hospital great
latitude in deciding who may practice there. The basic argument is that a
hospital is responsible for the welfare of its patients. 31 To fulfill this obli-
gation, the hospital must make certain, by establishing rigid standards, that
the members of its staff are competent. Hospitals reject the argument that
licensing procedures provide adequate standards to test the competency of
physicians.3 It is said that licensing laws provide only a minimum stan-
dard for certification and do not guarantee that a doctor meets the stan-
dards which an individual hospital feels are necessary to protect its pa-
130. The following examples involved one-hospital towns located, respectively, in New
Jersey, Pennsylvania and New York. In each case, the physician was denied the use of the
facilities with the results indicated:
The Law Division found that the Newcomb Hospital did not confine itself to
any specialized branch of medicine and had assumed the position and status of the
only general hospital open to the public within the convenient accessibility of the
inhabitants of the metropolitan area of Vineland, including Newfield; that the
plaintiff had suffered economic and other harm because he was not permitted
to admit his patients to the hospital or to serve them professionally once they were
admitted, or to use the emergency room services of the hospital; that his patients
suffered restrictions in their choice of physicians or hospital facilities because of the
plaintiff's inability to attend them professionally at the hospital, and that this was
not minimized by the fact that the plaintiff was permitted to visit them at the hos-
pital without, however any opportunity to read their charts or prescribe for them.
Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 394, 192 A.2d 817, 820 (1963).
It is obvious that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm unless injunctive relief
be granted him. The corporate defendant is the only osteopathic hospital in Lancas-
ter County. Elsewhere, the nearest of such hospitals is at York, some 30 miles
distant from Lancaster, and at Harrisburg, approximately 40 miles away. For all
practical purposes, therefore, the corporate defendant's hospital is the only one to
which Dr. Berberian can conveniently and satisfactorily have his many obstetrical
and other patients admitted. Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 395
Pa. 257, 261, 149 A.2d 456, 457 (1959).
If his patients require hospitalization, they must retain another physician. Since
the nearest other hospitals are considerably distant, petitioner alleges that his exclu-
sion from the city hospital at Fulton will effectively destroy his practice and de-
prive him of the right to practice medicine in that area. Alpert v. Board of
Governors of City Hosp., 286 App. Div. 542, 545, 145 N.Y.S.2d 534, 536 (1955).
The first two cases involved "private" hospitals, the third one was public. In Greisman,
the court held that in such a situation, the hospital would have to consider plaintiff's ap-
plication. In Berberian, the court found that the hospital's by-laws required a hearing
and sent the case back for one.
131. Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., supra note 130, at 403, 192 A.2d at 825.
132. For an interesting discussion of each side of the licensing argument comparc
Note, 74 YALE L.J. 151, 159-60 (1964), with Note, 74 YALE L.J. 1313, 1321-22 (1965).
For a critique of the standards and procedures in present medical licensure laws see
Hansen, Medical Licensure and Consumer Protection (Nov. 1962).
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tients.' 3' Furthermore, even if licensing laws did insure that the physician
was qualified at the time of his licensing, there is no periodic re-examination
to determine if he has kept abreast of modem medical techniques." 4 The
licensing procedure is also said to be inadequate because a license grants
the holder the privilege of performing the most delicate operations, even
though it certifies only that he has a general knowledge of medicine.' 35 The
license to practice, the argument continues, is only an indication of class-
room knowledge, not practical competence." 6 In addition, since in some
jurisdictions the hospital is liable for any injuries caused by staff members to
patients, the hospital (or its insurance company) demands wide discretion
in deciding who will be least likely to expose the hospital to a lawsUit. 137 Hos-
pitals also argue that the hospital staff must be able to operate as a unit;
apart from the question of individual professional competence, the mem-
bers of a hospital staff must be compatible. If for some reason a physician
cannot get along with other staff members, the hospital must have the right
to remove him."'
As in all legal controversies, there is validity in the positions of both
parties. In requiring that the rules promulgated by a public hospital bear
a reasonable relation to the welfare of its patients, the courts consider both
the need of a hospital to have some control over the physicians who practice
in it and that of a qualified physician to have access to hospital facilities.
In fact, the reasonableness rule is nothing more than a balancing process.
In contrast, the sound discretion rule applied to private hospitals simply
refuses to consider the physician's need for hospital facilities. The holding
that a court will not review the private hospital's decision results in con-
sideration of only the hospital's needs, since it is the hospital which makes
the decision. Unless the hospital, on its own volition, decides that a phy-
sician shall be heard, he is left without a voice in the decision to admit or
exclude him from staff membership. Furthermore, the fact that the hospi-
tal's decision may be based on a motive which bears no relation to the wel-
fare of the hospital's patients is of no importance."' The only justification
133. Ludlam, supra note 125, at 38; Note, 17 STAN. L. REv. 900, 901 (1965).
134. Ludlam, supra note 125, at 38.
135. Note 17 STAN. L. REv. 900, 901 (1965).
136. See Dayan v. Wood River Township Hosp., 18 11. App. 2d 263, 268, 152 N.E.2d
205, 207 (1958).
137. See Rosner v. Peninsula Hosp. Dist., 224 Cal. App. 2d 115, 36 Cal. Rptr. 332
(1964); cf. Group Health Ins. v. Howell, 40 N.J. 436, 193 A.2d 103 (1963).
138. Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y. Supp. 554,
af'd per curiam, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1924).
139. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sam v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 149 W. Va. 229,
140 S.E.2d 457 (1965).
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behind the sound discretion rule, as applied, is found in classic corporation
law. Since the business decisions of a private corporation are said to be
within the discretion of the corporation's directors, the same rule is said to
apply to a private hospital. 4 ' There are a number of objections to this
reasoning.
First, there is much authority that the rule governing the actions of the
boards of directors of private corporations is not a rule of absolute discre-
tion:
If in the course of management, directors arrive at a decision, within
the corporation's powers .. .and their authority, for which there is a
reasonable basis, and they act in good faith, as the result of their inde-
pendent discretion and judgment, and uninfluenced by any considera-
tion other than what they honestly believe to be the best interests of
the corporation, a court will not interfere with internal management
and substitute its judgment for that of the directors.... 41
Although a "business" decision by the board of directors is rarely set aside
in practice," the fact remains that the board of directors is not given abso-
lute discretion but is required to have a reasonable basis for its decision and
to act in good faith.
Second, even if the courts' interpretation of the sound discretion rule as
applied to private corporations is correct, a strong argument can be made
that the private hospital differs significantly from the private corporation.
The primary goal of the private hospital is not that of making a profit;
rather its "existence is for the purpose of faithfully furnishing facilities to
the members of the medical profession in aid of their service to the pub-
lic."' 43 A hospital, even a private one, exists to serve the public and to furnish
medical facilities to the members of the medical profession. Thus, the ac-
tions of the board of directors of a hospital should not be entirely insulated
from public scrutiny. As the Supreme Court said in Munn v. Illinois:
1
'
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public
has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use,
and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good,
140. E.g., Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y. Supp.
554, aff'd per curiam, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1924).
141. HENN, CORPOaATbONS § 233 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
142. E.g., Helfman v. American Light & Traction Co., 121 N.J. Eq. 1, 187 Atl. 540
(1936); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 160-61 (1946).
143. Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 404, 192 A.2d 817, 825 (1963).
144. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
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to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw
his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use,
he must submit to the control.'
Even if a private hospital cannot properly be described as a private cor-
poration, the question remains as to the validity of the distinction between
public and private hospitals apart from traditional corporation law. As
has been discussed, the decisive factor in determining whether a hospital is
public or private is often what the hospital happens to label itself in its
charter.'" There is no attempt to distinguish between the two on the basis
of purpose or function, undoubtedly because no such distinction exists. With
the development of such programs as Hill-Burton, both depend to a great
extent on the government for financial support."" It makes little sense
to hold that the actions of one group of hospitals will be subject to court
scrutiny while those of the other will not, when the purpose of both is to
provide medical facilities to the people of the community and when both
provide those facilities in exactly the same manner. Yet this was precisely
the result reached in Group Health Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc'y. 148
The court held that a public hospital had violated state antitrust laws by
conspiring with a local medical society to restrain trade in the field of con-
tract medicine, while a private hospital-which had performed exactly the
same act-was held not guilty. 19
This case is of additional interest in that it represents a flagrant example
of a court's allowing the sound discretion rule to cloud the real issues. The
sound discretion rule has no relevance to the question of whether the pri-
vate hospital helped to create a monopoly under the Washington constitu-
tion, which required only a showing of an agreement to fix prices, limit
production, or regulate the transportation of some product or commodity."'
If the physician and the public have a valid interest in seeing that the
decisions of a hospital's board of directors are made with the welfare of the
hospital's patients in mind, and if there is no valid reason for distinguishing
between public and private hospitals, then the courts should no longer re-
fuse to review the decision of a private hospital which denies a physician
staff membership. The questions which then arise are how effective review
145. Id. at 126.
146. For a discussion of the tests used to determine whether a hospital is public or
private see notes 2-6 supra and accompanying text.
147. See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
148. 39 Wash. 2d 586, 667-70, 237 P.2d 737, 780-81 (1951).
149. Ibid.
150. WASIK. CONST. art. 12, J 22.
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can be carried out, and what remedies should be open to the physician to
question his exclusion from staff membership.
Any remedy based on traditional contract law is ineffectual at best"" be-
cause the contracts involved are for a one-year period only, and are renew-
able at the hospital's option. To avoid an action based on contract, the
hospital has only to wait for the contract period to expire. The possibility
that the hospital may be allowed to amend its by-laws after the commence-
ment of the action further reduces the utility of an action based on contract.
Some relief is made available by decisions such as Simkins and Eaton, in
which the courts held that Negro physicians could not be denied the use
of hospital facilities because of their race." 2 However, these decisions are
obviously of limited utility.
To illustrate: suppose two applications for staff membership are filed
with a hospital receiving assistance under the Hill-Burton Act-one by a
Negro physician and one by a white physician. Under Simkins, the Negro
physician cannot be refused on the ground of race. But what if the hospi-
tal-acting as it always has, in the exercise of its sound discretion-simply
tells both doctors that their applications have been rejected? In all likeli-
hood, the Negro doctor will claim that his rejection was based on race. For
this reason, it is likely that the board will simply give an ostensibly valid
reason rather than face a court fight every time a Negro doctor applies for
staff membership. The private hospital will thus be moving toward the
standard of reasonableness required of public hospitals. No longer may it
arbitrarily deny the use of its facilities to any doctor who applies, unless it
wants to litigate the question every time a Negro is rejected. If it does go
to court in order to prove that the grounds are not racial, the hospital must
give some other ground for its decision. Furthermore, the reasons given will
have to be reasonable or they will be held a subterfuge for discrimination
in violation of the fourteenth amendment." 3
Meanwhile, the white doctor, who has been similarly rejected, is without
a remedy." 4 No one will assume that he is being denied his constitutional
rights simply because he is arbitrarily denied access to a hospital. The
151. For a full discussion of the remedy of breach of contract see notes 36-45 supra
and accompanying text.
152. The Civil Rights Act also provides that no person in the United States shall
be discriminated against under "any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). For a full discussion of the
effect of the Simkins and Eaton cases see notes 102-20 supra and accompanying text.
153. See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 967-68 (4th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).




hospital may still reject him without offering any explanation. The
courts will have reached the anomalous position of holding that, in practice,
a private hospital has absolute discretion to refuse a white physician admis-
sion, but only limited discretion to refuse admission to a Negro.
There are several forms of action which appear well suited to a case in
which a physician is refused admission to the staff of a private hospital.
However, the majority of courts refuse to entertain such actions on the
ground that the sound discretion rule insulates the hospital from liability."
For example, an action will normally lie when one intentionally causes
damage to another in the latter's business relations, when the former acts
with malice and without justification.15 This action would seem appropri-
ate when a physician loses patients because the board of directors refuses
to admit him to the staff of a private hospital in order to force him out of
business. The elements of the tort, damage to plaintiff's business relations
and unjustified and malicious conduct, are present. Yet the majority of
courts refuse to entertain the action, holding that the hospital was acting in
its sound discretion." 7
The action of conspiracy can also provide a useful framework for resolv-
ing the issues in these cases. The gist of this action is not the conspiracy
itself, but rather a tortious act in furtherance of a legitimate goal or an
innocent act in furtherance of a wrongful goal. 5 Unfortunately, a court
could easily refuse a physician relief under this theory on the ground that
the hospital's acts were in its discretion; therefore, there could be no tortious
act or wrongful goal. At least one court, however, has allowed a conspiracy
action despite the sound discretion rule when "a physician of the highest
qualifications is denied access to necessary hospital facilities as the result of
a conspiracy designed to restrain competition and deprive him of his prac-
tice in order to benefit competing members of the conspiracy.""' Thus,
this court has taken the reasonable position that it will not allow the sound
discretion rule to serve as a barrier to an examination of whether a conspir-
acy existed. If a wrong was committed, the court will give relief.
One commentator, however, has termed a civil action for conspiracy "not
an appropriate or practical method of questioning the reasonableness of a
hospital's restrictions."'" Two reasons are given to justify this statement:
155. E.g., Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 22 F. Supp. 59, 63 (D.D.C.
1963).
156. For a discussion of this action see notes 46-53 supra and accompanying text.
157. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
158. For a full discussion of this action see note 69 supra and accompanying text.
159. Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n, 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d 568,
26 Cal. Reptr. 640, (1962); accord, Cowan v. Gibson, 392 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1965).
160. Note, 17 STAN. L. Rzv. 900, 911 (1965).
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(1) the action is one for damages, and thus does not afford a proper mode
of relief to the physician refused staff membership; and (2) if injunction
were available, the doctor would have to prove not only his competence but
also the conspirators' unethical conduct. 1" '
As to the first objection, there is no reason why the action should be
limited to one for damages, although if damages could be proved, they
would compensate the physician to a limited degree. The theory of equity
is that an injunction will issue when the harm or threatened harm to the
plaintiff is such as may be termed "irreparable." ' 2  If the action taken by
the alleged conspirators will produce such injury, an injunction should issue.
Thus, to conclude that the only available remedy is one for damages is to
miss the point of the cases. Conspiracy to induce breach of contract, for
example, has been enjoined by the courts, 6s and the theory of those cases
could be applied when such action is alleged by a physician.
Furthermore, it is not indicated why unethical conduct on the part of
the defendant physicians and board members would be any more difficult
to prove than the wrongful agreements necessary to all conspiracy actions.1"
Although there is little authority on the question, an action based on an
unjustifiable refusal to deal seems extremely appropriate in these hospital
cases. Liability under this theory exists when "persons cause harm to
others by a concerted refusal in their business to enter into or continue busi-
ness relations even though they would not be liable for similar conduct with-
out concert, if their concerted refusal is not justified under the circum-
stances.""' Applying the five factors which the Restatement suggests should
be used in determining justification,"6" the following analysis is suggested
when a doctor has been denied the use of hospital facilities:
161. Ibid.
162. This term has sometimes been defined as that sort of injury "that ought not to
be submitted to on the one hand, or inflicted on the other." Nashville, C. & St. L.
Ry. v. McConnell, 82 Fed. 65 (M.D. Tenn. 1897); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Americus Const.
Co., 133 Ga. 392, 65 S.E. 855 (1909); Chicago Gen. Ry. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 181
Ill. 605, 54 N.E. 1026 (1899); HIGH, INJUNCTIONS 36 (4th ed. 1905); 2 WooD, Nui-
SANCES 1126 (3d ed. 1893).
163. Annot., 84 A.L.R. 43, 85 (1933).
164. Perhaps all that is meant here is that all actions in which physicians are called
on to testify to the competence of their brothers are difficult (as in malpractice cases).
However, even if this is true, it does not justify dismissing the action any more than it
justifies doing away with all malpractice actions. The fact that a case is difficult to
prove does not mean either that it should not be brought or that it would not afford
ample relief.
165. For a full discussion of this action see notes 77-83 supra and accompanying
text.




(1) The objects and interests of the conspirators. As staff members and
directors of a hospital, their interest must be the health and safety of the
patients and the good of the hospital. If the refusal to admit the plaintiff
is based on the interests of the patients, there will probably be no recovery.
If, on the other hand, they are motivated by a desire to monopolize the prac-
tice of medicine in the area or to injure the plaintiff in his business dealings
with his patients, the courts should allow recovery.
(2) The hardship caused the plaintiff. In these cases, the hardship is
obvious.""8 A physician is relegated to the position of little more than a
first aid station or a referral service for other physicians (who do have staff
positions) if he has no access to a hospital. In addition, his opportunity to
mitigate this hardship is limited. There are several possibilities. If the
plaintiff is situated in a small town where the defendant hospital is the only
one available, his chances to mitigate the hardship are virtually nil.' The
fact that there is a hospital in the next town is of no value to a plaintiff
who desires to practice medicine in a particular town. If his patients must
go to the next town for hospitalization, they will find a more convenient
physician. The results would be the same if there were a small number of
private hospitals which had conspired to exclude the plaintiff. The oppor-
tunity to mitigate hardship increases as the size of the town-and thus,
usually, the number of hospitals---increases. But unless a public hospital is
available to the physician, his chances will be slight."'
The action taken by the board of directors of one hospital seems to fol-
low a physician for the rest of his career. 1 If it becomes known that he
has been refused admission to the staff of a certain hospital, a shadow is
cast on future applications to other hospitals. Since the so-called private
hospitals are privileged to act in their sound discretion, and thus need assign
no reason for their actions, the physician's record may only report that he
has been rejected or dismissed.
(3) The appropriateness of the means chosen to reach the conspirators'
desired ends, and the availability of less harmful means. The appropriate-
nes of the means chosen must be examined in light of two general goals
which may be involved. If the aim of the conspirators is to injure the
plaintiff or set up a monopoly, the means chosen are irrelevant. Since the
goal is illegal, it should not matter what means are used to achieve it-the
conspiracy should be restrained. On the other hand, many hospitals con-
168. See notes 121-30 supra and accompanying text.
.169. See Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963).
170. See notes 28-35 supra and accompanying text.
171. See notes 128-29 supra and accompanying text.
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tend that all they are doing is trying to uphold their high standards and that
their only interest is the welfare of the patient.17 2 When the hospital direc-
tors honestly feel that they must act as they do in order to uphold the hos-
pital's standards, the means chosen should be examined by an impartial
third party, the court, to determine their appropriateness.
(4) The relationship between the physician and the hospital and their
relative economic power. There are three possible relationships. In the first,
the physician has staff privileges under a contract for one year with the
hospital. In the second, the physician's one year appointment has run out
and the board-in its sound discretion-has failed to reappoint him. In
the third situation, the physician has never had staff privileges. In all three,
the balance of economic power is obviously weighted in favor of the hospi-
tal. It is the physician who needs the use of the hospital, and the physician,
in all three instances, has no bargaining power. The fact that he is presently
under a contract is of little value; the hospital may refuse to renew it when
it expires.
(5) The effect of the conspiracy on the social interest in business enter-
prise. The effect of such a conspiracy on competition would, of course, be
greatest in a one-hospital town. A conspiracy by the directors and staff of
the hospital to keep a given physician off the staff would directly limit com-
petition." 3 The evil, however, is not limited to this situation. Since any
person may have need of hospitalization, and since it is doubtful whether
anyone examines the hospital affiliation of his family physician, the public
has an interest in seeing that every qualified physician is fully able to prac-
tice his art. The social interest in the successful practice of every licensed
physician is probably greater than in any other occupation. Elimination of
some competition may be helpful to tome individual doctors, but not to the
public at large. If there exists a problem in that unqualified physicians are
allowed to practice, then the problem is in the licensing laws. Once a phy-
sician has been licensed to practice, hospital boards ought not to be per-
mitted to sit as private licensing agencies."'
172. See, e.g., State ex reL Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 149 W. Va. 229,
140 S.B.2d 457 (1965).
173'. In larger cities, it is doubtful that all hospitals w6uld join together in this
manner. However, it is not unheard of. See United States v. American Medical Ass'n,
130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); United States v. American
Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 644 (1940); Group
Health Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
174. The AMA's House of Delegates has recently adopted a report, the conclusion of
which was "that every ethical licensed doct6r of medicine wh6 needs aid desire them
should have staff brivilezes in at least one accredited commlity hospital." AMA
News, Dec. 12, 1966, p. 9, col. 2.
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Despite the desirability of the balancing process which this theory em-
braces, one can expect many courts to hold that justification for the acts of
the hospital does exist, since those acts are within the board's sound dis-
cretion. However, if we remove this traditional rule, based on principles of
corporation law which are themselves of doubtful authority, there exists a
legal framework within which to decide these cases. This framework pro-
vides for a weighing of the contending policy factors, i.e., the right of a
hospital to protect its patients and itself from incompetent physicians and
the right of a competent doctor to practice his profession. In this action,
plaintiff-physician must show that the hospital acted without justification-
that its action was not based on its concern for the welfare of its patients.
A disinterested court can decide how, under a particular set of facts, the
two competing interests should be reconciled.
Finally, it has been demonstrated that limited court review of the actions
of the board of directors will not hamper the efficient administration of the
hospital. Courts have always been willing to hold the directors of a public
hospital to a standard of reasonableness.'75 There is nothing to suggest that
such a rule places any undue restrictions on the functioning of public hos-
pitals or that private hospitals are better run because their directors are not
so limited. In fact, it is submitted that if a board of directors knows that
the courts will require it to meet a standard of reasonableness or to show
some justification for its acts, the board will likely reach well-reasoned de-
cisions, rather than decisions based on personal preference or greed.
175. Rosner v. Peninsula Hosp. Dist., 224 Cal. App. 2d 115, 36 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1964).
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